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America, today, is in the process of a moral disintegration. This
process had its inception about 1917, when the United States entered
its first major war. Taken from their homes, uprooted, and disoriented,
young soldiers were led to excesses which they would have found in-
conceivable in their accustomed environment. The war was followed
by the Roaring Twenties and "Flaming Youth." This was the prohibi-
tion era, when it became fashionable to flout the law. Automobiles came
into greater use, and the term "parking" assumed a new connotation.
The crushing depression of the nineteen-thirties brought other prob-
lems. A period of economic want and psychic depression, this era
ushered in new materialistic philosophies. Many adolescents adopted
the conclusion of materialism before their parents realized what it was:
Where wealth and the flesh are the only ends in life, then wealth and
the flesh at any cost. The social chaos and disorientation of World War
II established the lowest standard of morality in the nation's history.
Each stage of immorality has complemented the other, and each
has exceeded its predecessor in the number of people corrupted. To-
day's headlines scream in large block type of sex orgies, rape, juvenile
gangs, vice clubs, narcotics rings, gambling syndicates, and murder, to
name only the most frequent. Juvenile crime has increased at an almost
unbelievable rate. All of this. poses a grave problem in the United
States. For history has recorded, too often to be ignored, that the
collapse of great nations is heralded by a deterioration of morals. If
this country is to keep its position as a world power, it can do so only
through the moral fiber of its citizens. It would seem almost axiomatic,
then, that a correction of moral laxity is essential to our continued
existence.
The causes of America's moral weakness are legion and embrace
all facets of modem civilization: social, economic, religious, and edu-
cational. This article is concerned with only one phase-modern litera-
ture in its book and magazine forms. Obscene literature, while certain-
ly not new to our civilization, is now flooding the newsstands and
bookstores of America with frightening regularity and with apparent
impunity. It is perhaps a debatable point as to whether this deluge of
indecent literature is the cause or the effect of America's moral disor-
ganization. It seems indisputable that a steady diet of pornography
will have aiy result but to implant in young impressionable minds an
obsession with sex that did not theretofore exist. This obsession, grow-
ing stronger with each new magazine, with each new book, must eventu-
ally express itself in external behavior. This behavior is inevitably
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degenerate and invariably criminal. J. Edgar Hoover, head of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, has stated:
"The increase in the number of sex crimes is due precisely to sex
literature madly presented in certain magazines. Filthy literature
is the great moral wrecker. It is creating criminals faster than
jails can be built."'-
To combat the menace of obscenity in print, the National Organiza-
tion for Decent Literature has been established under the leadership
of the Most Reverend John F. Noll, Catholic Bishop of Fort Wayne.
This organization has promulgated a code by which magazines and
books are approved or disapproved.2 As of July, 1950, no less than 250
magazines and comic books failed to pass this test. An almost equal
number of pocket size books and digest type of novels were similarly
disapproved.
While the code of the National Organization for Decent Literature
and the legal concept of obscenity differ in many particulars, it would
seem impossible, nevertheless, that nearly 500 publications which are
repugnant to decent men could be sold. For, while not completely uni-
form, practically every state has on its books statutes making illegal
the printing, publishing, sale, distribution, exhibition, or importation of
lewd, obscene, or indecent literature. Further, Congress has made such
matter non-mailable,3 and has prohibited its transportation in inter-
state commerce by common carrier.4 To understand the failure to bet-
ter enforce these laws, it is necessary to understand the problems con-
fronting the courts. While these problems are many and varied, they
may be summarized under two general headings: a confusion as to what
precisely obscenity is; and a fear to exercise a judicial censorship that
would violate the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press.
I
In 1868, Cockburn, C. J., stated the rule that has been fairly well
agreed upon:
"The test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
1 Quoted by John F. Noll, Manual of the National Organization for Decent
Literature (Huntington, Indiana), p. 122.
2 This code provides that all literature is banned which:
(1) glorifies crime or the criminal;(2) is predominantly "sexy";
(3) features illicit love;(4) carries illustrations indecent or suggestive; and(5) carries disreputable advertising.
3 18 U.S.C.A. §§1461 and 1463 (1950).
418 U.S.C.A. §1462 (1950).
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minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall."5
Most courts will follow this test, but many differences as to application
inevitably arise. Further, the distinction drawn by the Massachusetts
court has made interpretation of the test even more difficult, viz., that
a publication is not within the statutory prohibition merely because it
tends to coarsen or vulgarize youth if it does not manifestly tend to
corrupt their morals.8
In determining whether a publication falls within the statutes, the
courts have first found it necessary to determine how much of a book
or magazine need be devoted to obscenity before it has a tendency to
corrupt, and how much obscenity may be allowed for the sake of
"art." The court held in Regina v. HicklWn7 that if any portion of the
book was obscene, then the book itself was obscene. This view was up-
held in Commonwealth v. Friede.s The defendant in this latter case
was convicted of selling a book in violation of the Massachusetts'
statute,9 which book contained certain obscene, indecent, and impure
language, manifestly tending to corrupt the morals of youth. Only the
obscene portions of the book were read to the jury. The Supreme
judicial Court of Massachusetts found no error in the trial court's
instruction:
"It makes no difference what the object in writing this book
was, or what its whole tone is, if these pages that are complained
of, the language that is set out in the bill of particulars, is in
your mind obscene, impure, indecent, and manifestly tending to
the corruption of youth, then you must find a verdict of guilty."10
5 Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 16 W.R. 801, 11 Cox C.C. 19, 37 L.J.M.C.
89 (1868). In section 4 of its chapter on "Lewdness, Indecency and Obscenity,"
American Jurisprudence enlarges on this definition: "Obscenity was indictable
at common law, on the ground that what tended to corrupt society amounted
to a breach of the peace, and various acts and forms of obscenity are made
criminal offenses by statute or ordinance. The word obscenity cannot be
to be a technical term of the law and is not susceptible of exact definition in
its judicial uses, although it has been defined in a general sense as meaning
offensive to morality or chastity, indecent, or nasty. The statutes concerning
obscenity are usually broadly worded so as to cover all possible methods of
bringing the attention of decent persons to obscene papers, pictures, or articles.
the test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular
thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes is whether its tendency
is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral in-
fluences and into whose hands it may fall. Another test of obscenity is
whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency."
33 Am. Jur. 17. Cases are annotated in 81 A.L.R. 802, 24 L.R.A. 110, and 11
Ann. Cas. 306.6 Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. (2d) 840, 844 (1945).
7 Supra, Note 5.
8 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472, 69 A.L.R. 640 (1930).
9 G.L. c. 272, Sec. 28.
20 Commonwealth v. Friede, supra, note 8. The Supreme Judicial Court then
went on to remark, "The seller of a book which contains passages offensive
to the statute has no right to'assume that children to whom the book might
1951]
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This is no longer the prevailing view in the American jurisdictions,
however. A majority of the courts now accept the criterion enunciated,
not for the first time, in an opinion by Augustus N. Hand of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
"While any construction of the statute that will fit all cases is
difficult, we believe that the proper test of whether a given book
is obscene is its dominant effect. ' 1"
A book (or magazine) may, under this ruling, contain portions which
are patently obscene and yet be held not in violation of the statutes
prohibiting obscene literature, providing that such passages do not
flavor the whole tone or theme of the book. In reference to novels
this may be a correct view, for there is nothing wrong with realism
in literature. But if the author of such a book presents his passages
as pure pornography or in an approving light, then the court's holding
cannot be squared with any defined system of morality or public wel-
fare. By surrounding pornography with innocuous material, the au-
thor or publisher is being given a freedom of expression which is
destructive of moral society. However, if there are suggestive passages
in a book which are not so presented, it is neither morally nor critically
correct to condemn the book, even though a few of the sexually weak
are affected, for, as Harold C. Gardiner, S.J., says, "portrayal is not
an exhortation to emulation." It would certainly be more desirable,
nonetheless, if modern authors would handle their themes with the
same delicacy as did Emil Zola in his Nana.
But magazines fall into a separate catagory altogether. For partial
pornography is easily found when photographic. The youngster in
his teens will not read Joyce's Ulysses, but he will and does devote a
great deal of time to the "girlie" magazines which are in such great
supply on any magazine rack. The danger is not so much in the book-
stores as it is on these racks. And yet the courts, for want of better
definition from their legislatures, are using the same tests and rules
of law indiscriminately as to both magazine and book.
Perhaps no court has gone so far in allowing the sale of salacious
magazines as has the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio for Hamilton
County in State v. Lerner.'2 The defendant was indicted in this case
for selling a magazine devoted to the promotion of nudism, which
magazine contained various photographs of nude men, women, and
children, and for selling a series of twelve photographs of a female
come would not read the obnoxious passages or that if they should read them
would continue to read on until the evil effects of the obscene passages were
weakened or dissipated with the tragic denouement of a tale.' At page 322.
This case is criticized by Leo M. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Liter-
ature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 55.
"2 United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F. (2d) 705 (2d cir., 1934).2 Ohio Com. PL, 81 N.E. (2d) 282 (1948).
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disrobing-the first of her fully clothed, the others of her at various
stages as she disrobed, and the last showing a side view of her in the
nude. The court held that the magazine was not obscene, since it did
not emphasize sex in any way and did not pander to the lewd and
lascivious for profit. Without passing on the merits of nudism, the
propriety of placing such magazines on public newsstands is at best
doubtful. So placed, they come under the scrutiny of adolescents who
are impelled by a natural curiosity as to sex. It is a patent absurdity
to contend that these youngsters read such magazines from a detached
interest in the health giving benefits of the sun. They read them be-
cause of their stimulation of the sexual instinct. While the intention
of the publishers of a nudist magazine may not be to pander to the
lewd and lascivious, the actual result is in many cases the creation of
sex obsession in the young.13 A constant dosage of nudity can be ex-
pected to arouse a preoccupation with sex in the individual, and this
preoccupation, as we have said, often expresses itself in criminal be-
havior or in morally reprehensible acts. It would therefore seem to
follow that magazines of this nature would fall within the test for
obscenity given in the Hicklin case,14 and later cases. Nor does it matter
whether nudity (or partial nudity) constitutes only a portion of a
magazine or its whole content. For, unlike the novel, these pictorial
magazines have no other purpose or no other effect than to arouse
sexual passions, and only portions are necessary to this end.
With regard to the "Strip Tease Act," the twelve photographs of
a female disrobing, the court set up a new test for obscenity. The rep-
resentations must show a lack of neatness. Only where the actions are
slovenly can they be termed obscene.15 Further, if people act in any
particular way, then a pictorial representation of such acts is entirely
13 As Dr. James Walsh has said: "Just as soon as sex ideas find their way into
the consciousness, an excitation of certain nerve centers is produced, and this
by reflex but quite unconscious action causes more blood to find its way to
the sex centers of the spinal cord, thus highly sensitizing them. These produce
corresponding physical effects upon the external sex apparatus. The mental
reaction consequent upon these physical effects attracts increased attention
to the sex sphere and a tendency for the mind to become absorbed more or
less completely in the process....
'Preoccupation of mind with sex thoughts make for emphasis of feelings
to such a degree that their suppression becomes extremely difficult; and yet
this reaction which takes place in the tissues of the body is not so important
as that which occurs in the brain, if attention continues to be concentrated
on sex subjects with such exclusiveness as prevents diversion of mind from
taking place....
"Individuals who permit themselves to become addicted to sex thoughts
act thereby upon their sex sphere, so increasing its sensitivity and irritability
as to make it almost impossible for them to control their sex impulses." Quoted
by John F. Noll, op. cit., pp. 126-127.
"Supra, Note 5.
"There. is not anything distasteful to the eye in this series of photographs.
This young woman is neatly appareled and she has a nice face and form, and




proper. People do undress, ergo, photographs of the act of undressing
are proper.' 6 The fallacy of such a holding is apparent when one re-
flects on the many legitimate acts which are done only in privacy. Cer-
tainly the view of the Lerner case cannot be accepted as law in any
nation interested in promoting virtue among its citizens."
Works which have been held not within the purview of the statutes
are books of a scientific nature,'8 classical literature, 9 and works of
art 0 And it has further been held that the fact that children might
accidentally obtain a pamphlet intended for doctors, nurses, or adults,
would not bar its publication.' These decisions are correctly accepted
in most jurisdictions. But it is, nevertheless, the very reasonableness
of these decisions that has allowed so much salacious material to reach
America's newsstands. For no matter what the content of his publi-
cation, the defendant in a criminal action will claim immunity because
(1) his book contains scientific information; or (2) it is great litera-
ture; or (3) it merely reproduces works of art. Such spurious claims
are often successful because of the courts' reluctance or refusal to set
themselves up as critics of art and literature. 2
II
Dr. Samuel Johnson has well expressed the dilemma which is posed
by censorship of literature:
"He published about the same time his 'Areopagitica, a
Speech of Mr. John Milton for the liberty of unlicensed Print-
ing.' The danger of such unbounded liberty, and the danger of
bounding it, have produced a problem in the science of govern-
ment, which human understanding seems hitherto unable to
solve. If nothing may be published but what civil authorities
shall have previously approved, power must always be the stand-
"I "This young woman gives a photographic presentation of a woman disrobing.
There is not anything unchaste or shameful in a woman disrobing,-they do
disrobe;. . ." State v. Lerner, p. 294, supra, note 12.
1"A far better view is that expressed by Mr. Justice Philips: "To the pure all
things are pure, is too poetical for the actualities of practical life. There is
in the popular conception and heart such a thing as modesty. It was born
in the Garden of Eden.... From that day to this civilized man has carried
with him the sense of shame-the feeling that there were some things on
which the eye-the mind-should not look; and where men and women be-
come so depraved by the use, or so insensate from perverted education, that
they will not veil their eyes, nor hold their tongues, the government should
perform the office for them in protection of the social compact and the body
politic." United States v. Harmon, 45 Fed. Rep. 414, 423 (1891).
18United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, supra, note 11.
19 In re Worthington, 30 N.Y.S. 361, 24 L.R.A. 110 (Sup. Ct. 1894). The reason
generally advanced for excepting classical literature from the statutes is
that such books are not liable to reach the hands of the young.
20 People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408, 411, 48 Am. Rep. 635, 637 (1884).
21 United States v. Dennett, 39 F. (2d) 564, 568, 76 A.L.R. 1092 (2d cir., 1930).
2 "It is no part of the duty of courts to exercise a censorship over literary pro-




ard of truth; if every dreamer of innovations may propagate
his projects, there can be no settlement; if every murmurer at
government may diffuse discontent, there can be no peace; and
if every skeptick in theology may teach his follies, there can be
no religion. The remedy against these evils is to punish the
authors; for it is yet allowed that every society may punish,
though not prevent, the publication of opinions which that soci-
ety shall think pernicious; but this punishment, though it may
crush the author, promotes the book; and it seems not more rea-
sonable to leave the right of printing unrestrained, because
writers may be afterwards censured, than it would be to sleep
with doors unbolted, because by our laws we can hang a thief. '2 3
After some two hundred years society has come no closer to dis-
covering a solution than in Dr. Johnson's time. Americans are justly
jealous of the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press con-
tained in the First and Fourteenth Amendments.2 4 Such guarantees
are essential to keep the nation free from tyranny. As Jefferson said,
"Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be
limited without being lost." 25 For the power to censor one implies the
power to censor all.
Yet freedom of the press cannot be an unqualified freedom, for
that, in its way, is as tyrannical as absolute censorship. Between these
two extremes lies the method of which Johnson speaks, and which is
approved by Blackstone.2 It is rooted in the common law, and has
23 Dr. Samuel Johnson, "Life of Milton," The Six Chief Lives from Johnson's
"Lives of the Poets." Edited by Matthew Arnold (London, 1878), p. 59.24The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press. There is
no explicit prohibition in the Constitution forbidding the states from abridg-
ing this freedom, however. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in section
1, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
There has been an unsuccessful effort made to establish the rights enumerated
in the first eight Amendments as those privileges and immunities protected
against state action. This view has never been adopted by the courts. Never-
theless, by judicial decision it now seems established "that the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment preserve at least
those basic and fundamental rights enumerated in the First Amendment
against state action. In support of this, Mr. Justice Sanford said, in Gitlow
v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed.
1138 (1925), "For present purpose we, may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States."
25 Thomas Jefferson, Letter, 1786.
26 "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not
in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman
has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public;
to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what
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become the general rule of our jurisdictions today. It amounts to this:
a man may publish whatsoever he may will, but, if the matter be detri-
mental to the public welfare, then he will be punished. That obscenity
is detrimental to the public welfare, and, therefore, susceptible of pun-
ishment, is generally conceded.2 7 But punishment does not always ful-
fil its office. While the immediate end of punishment is to restore the
balance of justice, still the legislatures intend as the ultimate end to
discourage the publication of pornography. But modem Fagins, im-
pelled by their greed for profits, still publish and still sell obscene
literature. This literature reaches the newsstands and the hands of the
impressionable young, whether or not the publisher is ultimately pun-
ished. Since it should be the primary consideration of the state to pre-
serve its youth free from destructive influences, a further extension of
the law is indicated, even at the risk of occasional injustice at the hands
of arbitrary officials. This extension would be the use of the injunction.
In Near v. Minnesota,28 the Supreme Court of the United States
had before it the Constitutionality of a Minnesota statute which pro-
vided for the enjoining of (a) any obscene, lewd and lascivious news-
paper, magazine or other periodical, or (b) any malicious, scandalous
and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical? 9 The defen-
dant was convicted under that section relating to "malicious, scandalous
and defamatory" publications, which conviction was upheld by the
State Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed, holding that section of the statute unconstitutional because it
was an infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Constitutionality of the first
clause of the statute, relating to obscene literature, was not brought
into question, the Court said:
"The objection has also been made that the principle as to im-
munity from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every
such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is undoubtedly
true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely
unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in excep-
tional cases: 'When a nation is at war many things that might
be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that
no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right.' Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247,
249, 63 L. Ed. 470 .... On similar grounds, the primary re-
is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his
temerity." 4 B1. Comm. 151, 152.
27 "That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse
this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt
public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to
question." Gitlow v. People of State of New York, p. 667, supra, note 24.
2283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931).
29 Ch. 285, Sess. Laws of Minn., 1925.
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quirements of decency. may be enforced against obscene publi-
cations."3 0
It is unquestioningly within the authority of the legislatures to de-
fine what is not in the public interest, and to provide means to protect
the public from such elements, provided only, that Constitutional re-
quirements are not violated.3 1 One such requirement would be that
the provisions of the statute be definite so that all may know what
is prohibited.3 2 It would seem most reasonable for the legislatures to
confer upon the courts the authority to enjoin all obscene literature,
which literature could be defined with detailed exactness. Such a listing
should contain, inter alia, magazines devoted wholly or in part to the
pictorial presentation of nude and semi-nude females, whether such
representations are by drawing or by photograph; nudist publications;
comic books emphasizing sex or crime; publications which identify lust
with love or which relate in detail either licit or illicit sexual intimacies;
publications carrying suggestive cartoons; books and magazines pre-
senting immorality in an attractive light; and magazines carrying ad-
vertising for such immoral literature. The list of course could and
should be expanded. Inasmuch as this is not an attempt to draft a
statute, it, too, may be open to the charge of indefiniteness. Still, with
clear thought, and with the allowance of time to correct omissions and
discrepancies, a statute could be drafted which would stand up under
an attack of unconstitutionality, and which would remove printed ob-
scenity from the public eye. To prove the necessity for such a statute,
one needs only to go down to his comer drugstore and watch what
children read.
JAmEs E. HARPSTER
3ONear v. Minnesota, p. 715, supra, note 28.31 
"When a legislative body concludes that the mores of the community call for
an extension of the impermissible limits, an enactment aimed at the evil is
plainly within its power, if it does not transgress the boundaries fixed by the
Constitution for freedom of expression." Winters v. People of State of New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S. Ct 665, 92 L. Ed. 840 (1947).
s Ibid.
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